[1]李雪林,柳 絮,张 健,等.CPM4DA:基于双向拍卖的防串谋机制研究[J].南京师大学报(自然科学版),2026,49(01):83-95.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-4616.2026.01.009]
　Li Xuelin,Liu Xu,Zhang Jian,et al.CPM4DA: Research on Collusion Proof Mechanism Based on Double Auction[J].Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Natural Science Edition),2026,49(01):83-95.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-4616.2026.01.009]
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CPM4DA:基于双向拍卖的防串谋机制研究()

《南京师大学报（自然科学版）》[ISSN:1001-4616/CN:32-1239/N]

卷:
49
期数:
2026年01期
页码:
83-95
栏目:
计算机科学与技术
出版日期:
2026-02-10

文章信息/Info

Title:
CPM4DA: Research on Collusion Proof Mechanism Based on Double Auction
文章编号:
1001-4616(2026)01-0083-13
作者:
李雪林1; 2; 柳 絮1; 张 健1; 孙玉坤2
(1.江苏旅游职业学院信息工程学院,江苏 扬州 225001)
(2.江苏大学电气信息工程学院,江苏 镇江 212013)
Author(s):
Li Xuelin1; 2; Liu Xu1; Zhang Jian1; Sun Yukun2
(1.School of Information Engineering,Jiangsu College of Tourism,Yangzhou 225131,China)
(2.School of Electrical Information Engineering,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
关键词:
机制设计; 双向拍卖; 系统激励; 防串谋; 公平交易
Keywords:
mechanism design; double auctions; system incentives; collusion proof; fair transaction support
分类号:
TP399
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-4616.2026.01.009
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
双向拍卖是各类系统中极具效力的激励机制. 然而,现有双向拍卖研究主要聚焦于设计仅涉及买方或卖方单侧的防串谋机制,未能充分应对买卖双方联合串谋的场景,影响资源分配结果的公平性. 为此,本文先深入剖析双向拍卖中参与者(买卖双方)的串谋动机,并把串谋策略定义为提升联盟内参与者效用的同时降低联盟外参与者效用的行为. 基于这一视角,本文以优化资源分配为核心目标,设计了面向双向拍卖的防串谋(Collusion Proof Mechanism for Double Auctions,CPM4DA)机制,旨在降低市场参与者的串谋概率,保障资源分配公平性. 通过理论分析与证明,CPM4DA机制满足防串谋性、激励相容性、个体理性和弱预算平衡等关键博弈属性. 此外,本文在频谱市场中开展仿真实验,将CPM4DA机制与现有防串谋机制进行性能对比. 结果表明,CPM4DA在支付系数一致性、分配效率和防串谋性方面表现优异,能够提升市场定价公平性,降低参与者的串谋动机. 本文研究成果为双向拍卖中防串谋机制的研发奠定了理论与技术基础.
Abstract:
Double auctions are highly effective mechanisms for incentivizing various systems and markets. However,existing research on double auctions has primarily focused on designing collusion-proof mechanisms that involve just one side of the market—either buyers or sellers. This approach falls short in adequately handling scenarios where both buyers and sellers conspire collectively,significantly impairing the fairness of resource allocation outcomes. Therefore,we delve into the underlying motivations driving collusion among players(both sellers and buyers)in double auctions. Adopting an innovative approach,we define a collusion strategy as one that aims to increase the utilities of players within a coalition while simultaneously diminishing the utilities of those outside the coalition. This perspective forms the cornerstone of our efforts to deter collusion and develop a collusion-proof mechanism. With the primary objective of optimizing resource allocation,we have developed the Collusion Proof Mechanism for Double Auctions(CPM4DA). This mechanism has been designed to reduce the likelihood of collusion among market players and ensure fairness in resource allocation. The CPM4DA has been examined through theoretical analysis and proof,demonstrating its ability to meet essential game theoretic attributes such as collusion proof,incentive compatibility,individual rationality,and weak budget balance. Moreover,we have conducted simulation experiments to compare the performance of CPM4DA with existing collusion-proof mechanisms in the spectrum market. The results demonstrate that CPM4DA excels in payment coefficient consistency,allocation efficiency,and collusion proof,which can improve the fairness of market pricing and reduce the motivation of collusion among players. Our research findings establish the theoretical and technical groundwork for the development of collusion proof mechanisms in double auctions.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2025-12-16.
基金项目:江苏省重点研发计划项目(BE2021094)、国家自然科学基金项目(51977103、51877101)、江苏高校优势学科建设工程(三期)项目(PAPD-2018-87).
通讯作者:李雪林,副教授,研究方向:算法设计与分析,智能控制. E-mail:17189509@qq.com; 柳絮,博士,研究方向:算法博弈论. E-mail:1438239097@qq.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2026-02-10