[1]罗逸夫,喻志谦,王启瑞,等.一种针对物理层攻防特性的电力系统受击损失分析模型[J].南京师大学报(自然科学版),2026,49(02):98-109.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-4616.2026.02.010]
　Luo Yifu,Yu Zhiqian,Wang Qirui,et al.A Power System Loss Analysis Model Targeting the Offensive and Defensive Characteristics at Physical Layer[J].Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Natural Science Edition),2026,49(02):98-109.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-4616.2026.02.010]
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一种针对物理层攻防特性的电力系统受击损失分析模型()

《南京师大学报（自然科学版）》[ISSN:1001-4616/CN:32-1239/N]

卷:
49
期数:
2026年02期
页码:
98-109
栏目:
计算机科学与技术
出版日期:
2026-04-10

文章信息/Info

Title:
A Power System Loss Analysis Model Targeting the Offensive and Defensive Characteristics at Physical Layer
文章编号:
1001-4616(2026)02-0098-12
作者:
罗逸夫1; 喻志谦2; 王启瑞3; 曾志红1; 刘乃通1
1.长沙理工大学电气与信息工程学院,湖南 长沙 410114
2.广东电网有限责任公司珠海供电局,广东 珠海 519075
3.南京师范大学南瑞电气与自动化学院,江苏 南京 210096
Author(s):
Luo Yifu1; Yu Zhiqian2; Wang Qirui3; Zeng Zhihong1; Liu Naitong1
1.School of Electrical and Information Engineering,Changsha University of Science and Technology,Changsha 410114,China
2.Zhuhai Power Supply Bureau,Guangdong Power Grid Co.,Ltd.,Zhuhai 519075,China
3.School of Electrical and Automation Engineering,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210096,China
关键词:
鲁棒优化; 零和博弈; 电力系统; 安全防御; 线性化
Keywords:
robust optimization;  zero-sum game;  power system;  security defense;  linearization
分类号:
O224
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-4616.2026.02.010
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
聚焦于电力系统作为关键基础设施在军事行动和恐怖袭击等外部物理攻击过程中的易受击性,区别于信息网络单点攻击过程,构建了一种考虑物理层攻防范围特性的电力系统受击损失鲁棒优化模型. 首先,根据电力系统的地理信息和网架结构,建立了区域受击毁伤关联传播模型. 其次,考虑攻防双方的决策互动,建立了零和博弈双层模型. 最后,利用KKT条件和对非线性约束的逻辑展开实现模型线性化和精确求解. 算例验证表明,本文所提模型能够准确求解电力系统在面对物理攻击者最优进攻方案时的最小损失; 同时,不同防御资源分配方案的优劣会随着攻击者的能力而变化,反映了攻防博弈问题的复杂交互过程,进一步验证模型的合理性.
Abstract:
This study focuses on the vulnerability of power system as critical infrastructure during external physical attacks such as military operations and terrorist strikes, distinguishing it from the process of single-point attacks on information networks. A robust optimization model for power system loss under attack is constructed, considering the scope characteristics of attack and defense at the physical layer. Firstly, based on the geographical information and grid structure of the power system, a model for regional damage correlation propagation is established. Secondly, a two-level zero-sum game model is constructed considering the decision-making interactions between the attacker and the defender. Finally, the model is linearized and solved accurately using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)conditions and logical expansion of nonlinear constraints. Case studies demonstrate that the proposed model can accurately determine the minimum loss of the power system when facing the most dangerous attack plan by a physical attacker. Additionally, the superiority and inferiority of different defense resource allocation schemes vary with the attacker's capabilities, reflecting the complex interaction process of the attack-defense game and further validating the rationality of the model.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2025-04-23.
基金项目:广西青年创新人才科研专项项目(桂科AD22080052).
通讯作者:罗逸夫,博士研究生,研究方向:电力系统运行优化与受击分析. E-mail:ifluomiou@163.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2026-04-10